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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARVIN W. HANSEN and
BEVERLY M. HANSEN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
Case No. 14099
REUEL S. KOHLER and
DOLORES M. KOHLER, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents,
EARSEL G. PIERCE and
PATRICIA B. PIERCE, his wife,
Intervening Defendants
and Cross Claimants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS KOHLER
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to compel reconveyance of real property previously deeded to respondents Kohler, or to recover
its net value, on the ground that the conveyance to the
Kohlers was as security only.

Intervening defendants sought

damages from the Kohlers for breach of warranty, and against
the plaintiffs for slander of title.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a trial, the court dismissed the action and the
breach of warranty claim; and held plaintiffs liable for
damages to the intervenors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents Reuel S. and Dolores M. Kohler seek
affirmance of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent Reuel S. Kohler is a licensed real estate
broker.

In February/ 1969, Kohler acted as broker for Kent

Robinson in the sale of a four-plex in Salt Lake City.

By

the terms of an Earnest Money Agreement of February 28f
1969 (Exhibit 1), plaintiff Marvin W. Hansen agreed to purchase the four-plex for the price of $39,400.00, with a
down payment of $7,500.00 represented by a conveyance of
Hansen's home and land in Howell, Utah.

Hansen further

agreed to pay the present mortgage of $200.00 per month,
$110.00 per month on Robinsons1 equity and a $2,000.00
balloon payment on or before May 15, 1969. Kohler was to
receive a six percent commission ($2,364.00) from Robinson
for his services.
Thereafter, on April 1, 1969, a Uniform Real Estate
Contract (Exhibit 2) was entered into between the Hansens
and Robinsons containing the same essential terms included
in the Earnest Money Agreement.
Mr. Robinson desired to sell the four-plex but did not
want the Howell property.

The Robinsons and Kohlers
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therefore entered into a collateral agreement whereby the
Kohlers would receive the Howell property in exchange for
Mr. Kohler's agreement to waive the real estate commission
and to pay Robinson $2,000.00 (Tr. 23, Exhibit 6 ) .
On April 2, 1969, in furtherance of that agreement,
the Hansens executed a warranty deed (Exhibit 3) conveying
the Howell property to the Kohlers.

Robinson understood that

the conveyance was to transfer the property to the Kohlers
absolutely (Tr. 23).
Subsequently, a title search disclosed that the Howell
property was subject to a $19,000.00 mortgage (Tr. 13, 23,
36), and it was necessary to make some changes in the transaction.

On April 28, 1969, a supplemental agreement (Ex-

hibit 7) was executed.

The Hansens agreed to pre-pay to the

Robinsons $1,000.00 of the $2,000.00 due on May 15, 1969,
to manifest their good faith.

On June 12, 1969, the Hansens

and Robinsons signed another agreement (Exhibit 8), intended
to amend the April 1, 1969, contract as to the manner of the
down payment:
1. Sellers agree to accept as part of
down payment a 1967 Ford Thunderbird automobile. Buyer agrees to pay any and all
indebtedness off against said vehicle, and
transfer clear title to sellers.
2. Buyers agree to transfer title to
home and acreage in Howell, Utah, to Reuel S.
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Kohler and Dolores M. Kohler, his wife.
Warranty deed was executed 1 April 1969.
3. It is considered that Mr. Hansen
has made the May payment of $310.00.
Buyers and sellers agree that this together with other terms defined in said
contract constitutes the down payment.
Notwithstanding this agreement, the Hansens claimed that
the conveyance to the Kohlers was only as security for the
real estate commission (Tr. 30). The claim, however, is
contrary to the evidence presented by Mr. Hansen.
After the transaction, the parties1 conduct was consistent with an absolute conveyance, but inconsistent with a
mortgage.
There was no note to evidence an obligation to pay the
real estate commission (Tr. 30); no discussion of interest
on the obligation (Tr. 31); no time for payment was agreed
upon (Tr. 31); the Kohlers were given possession of the property (Tr. 32); they put a tenant in the property and were
permitted to collect the rents (Tr. 35); and tax notices
received by the Hansens were delivered to the Kohlers for
payment (Tr. 34).
The Kohlers conveyed the property to Earsel G. Pierce
and Patricia B. Pierce, the intervening defendants and cross
claimants herein, on October 18, 1971 (Exhibit 12).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WARRANTY DEED TRANSFERRING THE HOWELL PROPERTY TO
THE KOHLERS WAS NOT INTENDED AS A SECURITY INSTRUMENT.
The crucial factor in determining whether the conveyance of the Howell property to the Kohlers was absolute
or as security is the intention of the parties at the time
of execution and delivery of the warranty deed.
Brimley, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 (1972).

Kjar v.

The undisputed

testimony of Mr. Hansen indicates the absolute nature of the
transfer:
Q:

When you first entered into this transaction with Robinson, there was no question in your mind, was there, that you
were going to transfer the Howell house?

A.

None whatsoever.

Q.

Absolutely?

A.

True.

Q.

You were to have no interest in that?

A.

Right.

(Tr. 22).

At the time of the transfer the Hansens knew of the
transaction between the Kohlers and Mr. Robinson under which
the Kohlers would acquire the Howell property:
Q.

What did they tell you [as to why you were
conveying the property to Mr. and Mrs.
Kohler instead of the Robinsons]?
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A.

They told me they had a little deal
of their own pertaining to this property and for me to convey it directly to Mr. Kohler and they would
handle the warranty deeds themselves,
which wouldn't change my basic program.

Q.

So that you were still going to be
obligated to give that Howell property
free and clear?

A.

True.

Q.

That was your understanding, that it was
to be free and clear, wasn't it?

A.

True.

Q.

And you weren't to get any cash back or
anything else?

A.

That's right.

Q.

I suppose it was fairly clear in your
mind that under the transaction between
Kohler and Robinson, Robinson was going
to convey or arrange the conveyance of
the Howell property to the Kohlers?

A.

That was true.

Q.

And that was going to be as an absolute
conveyance and not a mortgage?

A.

That's true.

(Tr. 23).

The nature of the transfer itself indicates that an
absolute conveyance was intended*

The property was trans-

ferred by warranty deed and there was no competent evidence
that it was meant to be something else.

In Bybee v. Stuart,

112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948), the grantor executed a
warranty deed, absolute in form, in return for the grantee's
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premises to advance moneys necessary to pay off certain
creditors who were about to foreclose on his land. Contemporaneous with the deed, and as part of the same transaction, an agreement was entered into whereby the grantee
consented to reconvey the property upon the payment of the
indebtedness. Under these particular circumstances the
court properly held an absolute conveyance was not intended.
The court did, however, comment on the nature of title generally transferred by virtue of a warranty deed:
It is true, of course, that a warranty deed,
absolute in form, is presumed to convey a
fee simple title, or at least whatever title
the grantor has." 189 P.2d at 122.
A court in equity may show by parol evidence that a
deed absolute on its face was given for security purposes
only if the evidence is clear, definite, unequivocal and
conclusive.

Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Garley, 105

Utah 519, 143 P.2d 283 (1943); Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445,
25 P.2d 940 (1933); Northcrest Inc. v. Walker Bank and Trust
Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952).

With respect to the

standard and quality of evidence required to establish an
oral trust the following language from Chambers v. Emery,
13 Utah 374, 45 Pac. 192, 195 (1896) has been cited frequently
by this court:
In such event the proof must be strong,
clear, and convincing, such as to leave no
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doubt of the existence of the trust. Such
a case is similar to one where it is attempted to convert a deed absolute into a mortgage/ or where the reformation of a written
instrument is sought on the ground of accident,
mistake, or fraud. In all such cases the
court will scrutinize parol evidence with
great caution, and the plaintiff must fail unless it is clear, definite, unequivocal, and
conclusive. Public policy, and the safety
and security of titles to real estate, demand
this rule, because such evidence is offered
to overcome the strong presumption, arising
from the terms and conditions of an instrument
in writing, which is always the best evidence
of title. If it were once established that
the effect of the terms of a written instrument
could be avoided by a bare preponderance of
parol evidence, the gates to perjury would
soon be wide open, and no person could longer
rest in the security of his title to property,
however solemn might be the instrument on
which it was founded. 45 Pac. at 195.
In Jewell v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594
(1961) , the father transferred property to his daughter by
an outright conveyance subject to life estates for him and
his wife.

After their death the plaintiff sons alleged

the conveyance was in safekeeping for all the children.
There was conflicting testimony as to the father1s actual
intent.

The court relied on the absolute nature of the

deed in holding for the daughter:
The transfer of his home by the father
to Ethel was made by a deed absolute, subject
only to the life estates, and the authorities
are practically uniform to the point that to
justify a court in determining from oral testimony that a deed which purports to convey land
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absolutely in fee simple was intended to be
something different, such as a trust, such
testimony must be clear and convincing. The
proof must be something more than the modicum
of evidence which this court sometimes holds
to be sufficient to warrant a finding where
the matter is not so serious as the overthrow
of a clearly-expressed deed, solemnly executed
and delivered. 366 P.2d at 597.
Appellants allege that the Kohlers were to hold the
deed to the Howell property and all instruments in trust
until the deal was consummated.

This allegation is con-

trary to the express terms of the warranty deed and has not
been shown by a preponderance, let alone by clear and convincing evidence.

The evidence establishes that the Kohlers

received an absolute title to the subject property, and
thereafter, Mr. Hansen gave him the keys to the home on the
premises, did not challenge Kohlerfs right to put a tenant
in possession and retain the rents, and even delivered tax
notices on the property to the Kohlers for payment.
The agreement of June 12, 1969 (Exhibit 8), provides
expressly that the conveyance to the Kohlers is to be part
of the down payment.

Mr. Hansen read the agreement before

he signed it (Tr. 28). He was knowledgeable about deeds
and mortgages (Tr. 21) .
It is finally contended that subsequent to June 12,
1969, Kohler agreed to sell the property for Mr. Hansen
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and to work out a settlement. Any such agreement could
not establish a trust relationship.

In Skeen v. Marriott,

22 Utah 73, 61 Pac. 296 (1900) the court stated:
* * * nor are declarations of a purpose
to create a trust, or mere voluntary promises
to give property to a person or persons, or to
dispose of it in the future for the benefit
of such person or persons, when such promises
remain unfulfilled, sufficient to create a
trust, or any right which a court of equity
will enforce. Nor is a mere intention or
mere voluntary agreement to create a trust,
where the owner of the property contemplates
some further action by him to make it effectual,
sufficient to establish a trust. 61 Pac. at 300.
And in Hansen v. Hansen, 110 Utah 222, 171 P.2d 392
(1946) the court quoted the following from Breach on Trusts
and Trustees, Sec. 52:
In the creation of a trust in personalty,
as well as in real estate, the language employed
must be definite and positive. * * * In addition to this, the proof of the trust must be unequivocal. The declaration of a purpose to create
a trust is of no value, and a promise to make a
donation at some future time, where there is no
consideration, at best is only an imperfect gift,
and will not be upheld as a trust. 171 Pac. 21
at 397.
The only testimony offered was that of Marvin Hansen.
Plaintiffs did not call Kent Robinson, with whom the contract
was made.
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POINT II
ANY MODIFICATION OF THE APRIL 2, 1969, WARRANTY
DEED WAS REQUIRED TO BE IN WRITING.
For the purpose of the original transaction, the Howell
property was valued at $7,500.00 and constituted Hansen's
down payment on the purchase of the Robinson four-plex.
When it was subsequently discovered the property was encumbered by a $19,000.00 mortgage the property no longer was
an adequate down payment and something else had to be done
to assure performance of the contract.

Jfir. Hansen testi-

fied:
Q.

And when that occurred [discovery of the
mortgage] it looked like your deal with
Mr. Robinson wasn't going to go through,
didn't it?

A.

Well, we had to do something, that was
obvious.

The parties then agreed that Robinson, in addition to
the Howell property, would accept as further down payment
Hansen's 1967 Ford Thunderbird automobile.

This agreement

was set forth in the June 12, 1969, supplemental agreement
which also contained the following provision:
Buyers agree to transfer title to home
and acreage in Howell, Utah, to Reuel S.
Kohler and Dolores M. Kohler, his wife. Warranty Deed was executed 1 April, 1969.
*

*

*

Buyers and sellers agree that this together with other terms defined in said contract constitutes the down payment.

As of April 2, 1969, there is no dispute that the
Kohlers held title to the Kohler property in fee simple
absolute.

To subsequently divest the Kohlers of this

interest would require a written surrender subscribed to
by the Kohlers.

Section 25-5-5 Utah Code Annotated pro-

vides:
No estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one year,
nor any trust or power over or concerning real
property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in
writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
The June 12, 1969, agreement does not on its face purport to divest in any manner the absolute nature of the
Kohlers' interest in the Howell property.

Rather, this

agreement makes specific reference to the April 1, 1969,
warranty deed and confirms its terras. Nothing in either
the warranty deed or June 12, 1969, agreement substantiates
appellants1 contention that the Kohlers held the property
in trust until the real estate commission was paid.
The trial court found that any agreements made subsequent to June 12, 1969, respecting reconveyance of the
Howell property to appellants were too vague and uncertain,

-12-

were oral, and were without consideration.

In Bybee v.

Stuart, supra, this court held an oral surrender of an
interest in property is ineffectual under the Statute of
Frauds under circumstances similar to the case at bar.
The court stated:
[D]efendant testified to a conversation
between himself and his brother, Oni, by which
it is claimed Oni orally surrendered to defendant any interest he had in the property. The
court found that such a conversation did take
place, and his finding is cross-assigned as
error by the appellees. However, the court
found that this purported surrender was ineffectual under the Statute of Frauds - Sees.
33-5-1 and 33-5-3, U.C.A., 1943. Defendant
contends that Oni Stuart's oral surrender of
his interest in the premises was valid.
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon appellees] cross-assignment of error, since we
are of the opinion that even if such conversation took place as was testified to by defendant, it was within the Statute of Frauds and
therefore unenforceable. 189 P.2d at 122.
POINT III
THE DOCTRINES OF RESULTING OR CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ARE
NOT APPLICABLE.
Appellants in their brief rely on the equitable principles of a resulting or constructive trust to compel the
Kohlers to either reconvey the Howell property or to pay
appellants the difference between the $7,500.00 "value" of
the property and Mr. Kohler's commission.

Reliance on these

doctrines is unfounded, however, as the factual circumstances
of this case preclude their applicability.
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Section 404 of Restatement 2d, Trusts, indicates
these circumstances in which resulting trusts arise:
A resulting trust arises where a person makes
or causes to be made a disposition of property
under circumstances which raise an inference
that he does not intend that the person taking
or holding the property should have the beneficial interest therein, unless the inference is
rebutted or the beneficial interest is otherwise effectively disposed of.
There are three situations where a resulting trust may
arise:

(1) where a private or charitable trust fails in

whole or in part; (2) where a private or charitable trust
is fully performed without exhausting the trust estate; and
(3) where property is purchased and the purchase price is
paid by one person and at his direction the vendor transfers
the property to another person.

Restatement 2df Trusts,

Chapter 12, General Principles. None of the situations abovedescribed are present in the instant case and it is therefore
improper to consider this case under a resulting trust theory.
In order to establish a constructive trust there must
be some fraudulent or unfair and unconscionable conduct in
the transaction by which the trustee acquires the property
rendering it inequitable for the trustee to retain absolute
title.

89 C.J.S., Trusts, §139.

In certain situations

where a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties
the courts in equity will presume fraud.
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In Hawkins v. Perry,

123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953)f the court observed:
Equity imposes a constructive trust to prevent one from unjustly profiting through
fraud or the violation of a duty imposed
under a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 253 P.2d at 375.
In Renshaw v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 87 Utah 364,
49 P.2d 403 (1935), the court commented:
It is true that, upon the establishment of certain fiduciary relationship and
transactions between the parties to that
relationship, equity will presume fraud,
the abuse of confidence, and place the burden of proving good faith and fairness upon
the dominant party in the relationship.
In such cases the presumption of fraud may
be based upon the relationship alone and
relieves the party from proving the fraud,
but the fraud is nevertheless an essential
element. By the presumption equity supplies
that element. The relationships wherein
such presumption has been indulged are parent and child, principal and agent, attorney
and client, guardian and ward, executor or
administrator and heir, beneficiary or distributee. In other cases the presumption of
fraud has been given effect when there has
been a relationship of confidence plus other
circumstances tending to show that some advantage had been taken by the dominant party
with a consequent abuse of confidence. 49
P.2d at 404.
In Renshaw the court had to determine whether a relationship
of employer and employee alone would raise a presumption of
fraud in a transaction where the employee loaned the employer
some money.

The court held the mere employee-employer rela-

tionship, standing alone, would not raise the presumption
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of fraud and that facts establishing such an abuse of confidence placed as would warrant fraud would have to be
shown.

The court stated:

It is not every relationship to which the
term "fiduciary" or "confidential" might be
applied with some degree of reason or plausibility that will authorize, by itself alone,
the creation of the presumption of fraud in
the dealings between each other of those occupying that relationship* Every business
transaction involves a certain amount of confidence and trust. Equity will not discourage
transactions by creating presumptions of their
fraudulent nature, except in those cases where
the transactions occur between parties to relationships which by their very nature it is
the policy of the law to protect one of the
parties thereto on the theory that they are
not dealing on an equal basis because of the
confidence which one party to the relationship
is presumed to have in the other. See Perry
on Trusts and Trustees (6th Ed.) §194? 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. (4th Ed.) §§955, 956. It
is always a question, therefore, of the actual
relationship between the parties that must be
inquired into, and not whether the terms "fiduciary," "confidential," or "trust" can, with
some degree of reason, be applied to the relationship. 49 P.2d at 404.
In Bradbury v. Rassmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d
710 (1965), the plaintiffs brought an action to declare null
and void a warranty deed, a lease agreement, and a transfer
of water stock certificates to their niece and her husband.
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant represented the transaction to be a sale of the farm and water stock when the
documents, in fact, purported to make a gift of such property.
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The court held the confidence and trust which plaintiffs
had in the defendants was not sufficient to establish such
a confidential relationship as would raise a presumption
of unfairness in the transaction or a finding of undue influence.

The court stated:

The relationship must be such as would
lead an ordinarily prudent person in
the management of his business affairs
to repose that degree of confidence in the
other party which largely results in the
substitution of the will of the latter for
that of the former in the material matters
involved in the transaction. The doctrine
of confidential relationship rests upon the
principle of inequality between the parties,
and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the parties over the other.
Mere confidence in one person by another
is not sufficient alone to constitute such
a relationship. The confidence must be reposed by one under such circumstances as to
create a corresponding duty, either legal or
moral, upon the part of the other to observe
the confidence, and it must result in a situation where as a matter of fact there is superior influence on one side and dependence on
the other. 401 P.2d at 713.
This crux of this case is an attempt to show that documents are not really what they purport to be.

The resulting

trust doctine is inapplicable because the factual context
of the case is wholly inconsistent with the circumstances
under which resulting trusts are derived.

The constructive

trust doctrine is equally inapplicable as an essential prerequisite to establishment of a constructive trust is a
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showing of fraud or a fiduciary relationship which has been
betrayed.
Mr. Kohler was never employed by Mr. Hansen to represent
him in the subject transaction but was acting as a broker
for the Robinsons. Mr. Kohler occupied a fiduciary relationship to the Robinsons, Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119f 329
P.2d 410 (1958)f but not to the Hansens. A real estate
broker does not ordinarily represent both parties to a transaction.

61-2-11(4), Utah Code Annotated 1953. The trans-

action between the Kohlers and the Robinsons was an arms
length transaction; and after April 2, 1969, Mr. Hansen knew
the Kohlers were dealing in their own behalf with respect
to the Howell property.

Assuming a confidential relationship

ever existed, the relationship would have terminated on
April 2, 1969, when the warranty deed conveying the Howell
property was transferred, and did not exist at the time of
the June 12, 1969, transaction.

The facts do not raise any

presumption of fraud or unfairness in the transaction.
CONCLUSION
The Hansens conveyed the Howell property to the Kohlers
by warranty deed.

Mr. Hansen was aware of both the nature

and consequences of such a conveyance, and clearly intended
to divest himself of all incidents of ownership in the subject property.

While the parties are in disagreement as to
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the nature of the title held by the Kohlers after the discovery of the encumbrance on the Howell property the decision of the trial court should be affirmed on two grounds:
(1) the appellants have failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the warranty deed was meant as a security
instrument rather than an outright transfer of property, and
(2) to change what was formerly a clear transfer of property
to a security instrument would have to be in writing and
subscribed to by the Kohlers.

Respectfully submitted,
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARVIN W. HANSEN and
BEVERLY M. HANSEN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
Case No. 14099
REUEL S. KOHLER and
DOLORES M. KOHLER, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents,
EARSEL G. PIERCE and
PATRICIA B. PIERCE, his wife,
Intervening Defendants
and Cross Claimants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS KOHLER
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to compel reconveyance of real property previously deeded to respondents Kohler, or to recover
its net value, on the ground that the conveyance to the
Kohlers was as security only.

Intervening defendants sought

damages from the Kohlers for breach of warranty, and against
the plaintiffs for slander of title.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a trial, the court dismissed the action and the
breach of warranty claim; and held plaintiffs liable for
damages to the intervenors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

*

Respondents Reuel S. and Dolores M. Kohler seek
f

affirmance of the judgment.

m

STATEMENT OF FACTS
. f

Respondent Reuel S. Kohler is a licensed real estate
broker.

In February, 1969, Kohler acted as broker for Kent

Robinson in the sale of a four-plex in Salt Lake City.

|
„

By

the terms of an Earnest Money Agreement of February 28,

1

1969 (Exhibit 1), plaintiff Marvin W. Hansen agreed to purchase the four-plex for the price of $39#400.00, with a
down payment of $7,500.00 represented by a conveyance of

I

|

-

.I
Hansen's home and land in Howell, Utah. Hansen further
agreed to pay the present mortgage of $200.00 per month,

'•
1
I

$110.00 per month on Robinsons1 equity and a$2,000.00
balloon payment on or before May 15, 1969. Kohler was to
receive a six percent commission ($2,364.00) from Robinson

1
|
,

for his services.
Thereafter, on April 1, 1969, a Uniform Real Estate

p

l

Contract (Exhibit 2) was entered into between the Hansens
l

and Robinsons containing the same essential terms included

^

in the Earnest Money Agreement.

p

Mr. Robinson desired to sell the four-plex but did not
want the Howell property.

The Robinsons and Kohlers

i
§

therefore entered into a collateral agreement whereby the
Kohlers would receive the Howell property in exchange for
Mr. Kohler's agreement to waive the real estate commission
and to pay Robinson $2,000.00 (Tr. 23, Exhibit 6 ) .
On April 2, 1969, in furtherance of that agreement,
the Hansens executed a warranty deed (Exhibit 3) conveying
the Howell property to the Kohlers. Robinson understood that
the conveyance was to transfer the property to the Kohlers
absolutely (Tr. 23) .
Subsequently, a title search disclosed that the Howell
property was subject to a $19,000.00 mortgage (Tr. 13, 23,
36), and it was necessary to make some changes in the transaction.

On April 28, 1969, a supplemental agreement (Ex-

hibit 7) was executed.

The Hansens agreed to pre-pay to the

Robinsons $1,000.00 of the $2,000.00 due on May 15, 1969,
to manifest their good faith.

On June 12, 1969, the Hansens

and Robinsons signed another agreement (Exhibit 8) , intended
to amend the April 1, 1969, contract as to the manner of the
down payment:
1.• Sellers agree to accept as part of
down payment a 1967 Ford Thunderbird automobile. Buyer agrees to pay any and all
indebtedness off against said vehicle, and
transfer clear title to sellers.
2. Buyers agree to transfer title to
home and acreage in Howell, Utah, to Reuel S.
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Kohler and Dolores M. Kohler, his wife.
Warranty deed was executed 1 April 1969.
3. It is considered that Mr. Hansen
has made the May payment of $310.00.
Buyers and sellers agree that this together with other terms defined in said
contract constitutes the down payment.
Notwithstanding this agreement, the Hansens claimed that
the conveyance to the Kohlers was only as security for the
real estate commission (Tr* 30). The claim, however, is
contrary to the evidence presented by Mr. Hansen.
After the transaction, the parties1 conduct was consistent with an absolute conveyance, but inconsistent with a
mortgage.
There was no note to evidence an obligation to pay the
real estate commission (Tr. 30); no discussion of interest
on the obligation (Tr. 31); no time for payment was agreed
upon (Tr. 31); the Kohlers were given possession of the property (Tr. 32); they put a tenant in the property and were
permitted to collect the rents (Tr. 35); and tax notices
received by the Hansens were delivered to the Kohlers for
payment (Tr. 34) .
The Kohlers conveyed the property to Earsel G. Pierce
and Patricia B. Pierce, the intervening defendants and cross
claimants herein, on October 18, 1971 (Exhibit 12).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WARRANTY DEED TRANSFERRING THE HOWELL PROPERTY TO
THE KOHLERS WAS NOT INTENDED AS A SECURITY INSTRUMENT.
The crucial factor in determining whether the conveyance of the Howell property to the Kohlers was absolute
or as security is the intention of the parties at the time
of execution and delivery of the warranty deed.
Brimley, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 (1972).

Kjar v.

The undisputed

testimony of Mr. Hansen indicates the absolute nature of the
transfer:
Q:

When you first entered into this transaction with Robinson, there was no question in your mind, was there, that you
were going to transfer the Howell house?

A.

None whatsoever.

Q.

Absolutely?

A.

True.

Q.

You were to have no interest in that?

A.

Right.

(Tr. 22).

At the time of the transfer the Hansens knew of the
transaction between the Kohlers and Mr. Robinson under which
the Kohlers would acquire the Howell property:
Q.

What did they tell you [as to why you were
conveying the property to Mr. and Mrs.
Kohler instead of the Robinsons]?

-5-

A.

Q.

They told me they had a little deal
of their own pertaining to this property and for me to convey it directly to Mr. Kohler and they would
handle the warranty deeds themselves,
which wouldn't change my basic program.
So that you were still going to be
obligated to give that Howell property
free and clear?

[
,
*
1
i

A.

True.

Q.

That was your understanding, that it was
to be free and clear, wasn't it?

'

A.

True.

1

Q.

And you weren't to get any cash back or
anything else?

1
i

i
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

That's right.
I suppose it was fairly clear in your
mind that under the transaction between
Kohler and Robinson, Robinson was going
to convey or arrange the conveyance of
the Howell property to the Kohlers?
That was true.

|
1
|

And that was going to be as an absolute
conveyance and not a mortgage?

I

That's true.

*

(Tr. 23).

The nature of the transfer itself indicates that an
absolute conveyance was intended.

"

f
I

The property was trans-

ferred by warranty deed and there was no competent evidence
that it was meant to be something else.

In Bybee v. Stuart,

1
|
B

112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948), the grantor executed a

•

warranty deed, absolute in form, in return for the grantee's

I

premises to advance moneys necessary to pay off certain
creditors who were about to foreclose on his land. Contemporaneous with the deed, and as part of the same transaction, an agreement was entered into whereby the grantee
consented to reconvey the property upon the payment of the
indebtedness.

Under these particular circumstances the

court properly held an absolute conveyance was not intended.
The court did, however, comment on the nature of title generally transferred by virtue of a warranty deed:
It is true, of course, that a warranty deed,
absolute in form, is presumed to convey a
fee simple title, or at least whatever title
the grantor has." 189 P.2d at 122.
A court in equity may show by parol evidence that a
deed absolute on its face was given for security purposes
only if the evidence is clear, definite, unequivocal and
conclusive.

Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Garley, 105

Utah 519, 143 P.2d 283 (1943); Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445,
25 P.2d 940 (1933); Northcrest Inc. v. Walker Bank and Trust
Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952).

With respect to the

standard and quality of evidence required to establish an
oral trust the following language from Chambers v. Emery,
13 Utah 374, 45 Pac. 192, 195 (1896) has been cited frequently
by this court:
In such event the proof must be strong,
clear, and convincing, such as to leave no
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doubt of the existence of the trust. Such
a case is similar to one where it is attempted to convert a deed absolute into a mortgage, or where the reformation of a written
instrument is sought on the ground of accident,
mistake, or fraud. In all such cases the
court will scrutinize parol evidence with
great caution, and the plaintiff must fail unless it is clear, definite, unequivocal, and
conclusive. Public policy, and the safety
and security of titles to real estate, demand
this rule, because such evidence is offered
to overcome the strong presumption, arising
from the terms and conditions of an instrument
in writing, which is always the best evidence
of title. If it were once established that
the effect of the terms of a written instrument
could be avoided by a bare preponderance of
parol evidence, the gates to perjury would
soon be wide open, and no person could longer
rest in the security of his title to property,
however solemn might be the instrument on
which it was founded. 45 Pac. at 195.
In Jewell v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594

*
t
ff

1

'
i
J
J
*
1
J
I
J

(1961), the father transferred property to his daughter by
an outright conveyance subject to life estates for him and
. . .

i

his wife. After their death the plaintiff sons alleged

I

the conveyance was in safekeeping for all the children.

1

There was conflicting testimony as to the father's actual

.' j
i

intent.

The court relied on the absolute nature of the

deed in holding for the daughter:
The transfer of his home by the father
to Ethel was made by a deed absolute, subject
only to the life estates, and the authorities
are practically uniform to the point that to
justify a court in determining from oral testimony that a deed which purports to convey land
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absolutely in fee simple was intended to be
something different, such as a trust, such
testimony must be clear and convincing. The
proof must be something more than the modicum
of evidence which this court sometimes holds
to be sufficient to warrant a finding where
the matter is not so serious as the overthrow
of a clearly-expressed deed, solemnly executed
and delivered. 366 P.2d at 597.
Appellants allege that the Kohlers were to hold the
deed to the Howell property and all instruments in trust
until the deal was consummated.

This allegation is con-

trary to the express terms of the warranty deed and has not
been shown by a preponderance, let alone by clear and convincing evidence.

The evidence establishes that the Kohlers

received an absolute title to the subject property, and
thereafter, Mr. Hansen gave him the keys to the home on the
premises, did not challenge Kohler's right to put a tenant
in possession and retain the rents, and even delivered tax
notices on the property to the Kohlers for payment.
The agreement of June 12, 1969 (Exhibit 8), provides
expressly that the conveyance to the Kohlers is to be part
of the down payment.

Mr. Hansen read the agreement before

he signed it (Tr. 28). He was knowledgeable about deeds
and mortgages (Tr. 21) .
It is finally contended that subsequent to June 12,
1969, Kohler agreed to sell the property for Mr. Hansen
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and to work out a settlement.

Any such agreement could

not establish a trust relationship.

In Skeen v. Marriott,

22 Utah 73, 61 Pac. 296 (1900) the court stated:
" * * * nor are declarations of a purpose
to create a trust, or mere voluntary promises
to give property to a person or persons, or to
dispose of it in the future for the benefit
of such person or persons, when such promises
remain unfulfilled, sufficient to create a
trust, or any right which a court of equity
will enforce. Nor is a mere intention or
mere voluntary agreement to create a trust,
where the owner of the property contemplates
some further action by him to make it effectual,
sufficient to establish a trust. 61 Pac. at 300.
And in Hansen v. Hansen, 110 Utah 222, 171 P.2d 392
(1946) the court quoted the following from Breach on Trusts
and Trustees, Sec. 52:
In the creation of a trust in personalty,
as well as in real estate, the language employed
must be definite and positive. * * * In addition to this, the proof of the trust must be unequivocal. The declaration of a purpose to create
a trust is of no value, and a promise to make a
donation at some future time, where there is no
consideration, at best is only an imperfect gift,
and will not be upheld as a trust. 171 Pac. 21
at 397.
The only testimony offered was that of Marvin Hansen.
Plaintiffs did not call Kent Robinson, with whom the contract
was made.

-10-

POINT II
ANY MODIFICATION OF THE APRIL 2, 1969, WARRANTY
DEED WAS REQUIRED TO BE IN WRITING.
For the purpose of the original transaction, the Howell
property was valued at $7,500.00 and constituted Hansen's
down payment on the purchase of the Robinson four-plex.
When it was subsequently discovered the property was encumbered by a $19,000.00 mortgage the property no longer was
an adequate down payment and something else had to be done
to assure performance of the contract.

Mr. Hansen testi-

fied:
Q.

And when that occurred [discovery of the
mortgage] it looked like your deal with
Mr. Robinson wasn't going to go through,
didn't it?

A.

Well, we had to do something, that was
obvious.

The parties then agreed that Robinson, in addition to
the Howell property, would accept as further down payment
Hansen's 1967 Ford Thunderbird automobile.

This agreement

was set forth in the June 12, 1969, supplemental agreement
which also contained the following provision:
Buyers agree to transfer title to home
and acreage in Howell, Utah, to Reuel S.
Kohler and Dolores M. Kohler, his wife. Warranty Deed was executed 1 April, 1969.
*

*

*

Buyers and sellers agree that this together with other terms defined in said contract constitutes the down payment.

-11-

As of April 2, 1969, there is no dispute that the
Kohlers held title to the Kohler property in fee simple
absolute.

To subsequently divest the Kohlers of this

interest would require a written surrender subscribed to
by the Kohlers.

Section 25-5-5 Utah Code Annotated pro-

vides:
No estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one year,
nor any trust or power over or concerning real
property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in
writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
The June 12, 1969, agreement does not on its face purport to divest in any manner the absolute nature of the
Kohlers1 interest in the Howell property.

Rather, this

agreement makes specific reference to the April 1, 1969,
warranty deed and confirms its terms. Nothing in either
the warranty deed or June 12, 1969, agreement substantiates
appellants1 contention that the Kohlers held the property
in trust until the real estate commission was paid.
The trial court found that any agreements made subsequent to June 12, 1969, respecting reconveyance of the
Howell property to appellants were too vague and uncertain,
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were oral, and were without consideration.

In Bybee v.

Stuart, supra, this court held an oral surrender of an
interest in property is ineffectual under the Statute of
Frauds under circumstances similar to the case at bar.
The court stated:
[D]efendant testified to a conversation
between himself and his brother, Oni, by which
it is claimed Oni orally surrendered to defendant any interest he had in the property. The
court found that such a conversation did take
place, and his finding is cross-assigned as
error by the appellees. However, the court
found that this purported surrender was ineffectual under the Statute of Frauds - Sees.
33-5-1 and 33-5-3, U.C.A., 1943. Defendant
contends that Oni Stuart's oral surrender of
his interest in the premises was valid.
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon appellees' cross-assignment of error, since we
are of the opinion that even if such conversation took place as was testified to by defendant, it was within the Statute of Frauds and
therefore unenforceable. 189 P.2d at 122.
POINT III
THE DOCTRINES OF RESULTING OR CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ARE
NOT APPLICABLE.
Appellants in their brief rely on the equitable principles of a resulting or constructive trust to compel the
Kohlers to either reconvey the Howell property or to pay
appellants the difference between the $7,500.00 "value" of
the property and Mr. Kohler's commission.

Reliance on these

doctrines is unfounded, however, as the factual circumstances
of this case preclude their applicability.
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Section 404 of Restatement 2d, Trusts, indicates
these circumstances in which resulting trusts arise:
A resulting trust arises where a person makes
or causes to be made a disposition of property
under circumstances which raise an inference
that he does not intend that the person taking
or holding the property should have the beneficial interest therein, unless the inference is
rebutted or the beneficial interest is otherwise effectively disposed of.
There are three situations where a resulting trust may
arise:

(1) where a private or charitable trust fails in

whole or in part; (2) where a private or charitable trust
is fully performed without exhausting the trust estate; and
(3) where property is purchased and the purchase price is
paid by one person and at his direction the vendor transfers
the property to another person*

Restatement 2d, Trusts,

Chapter 12, General Principles. None of the situations above-*
described are present in the instant case and it is therefore
improper to consider this case under a resulting trust theory.
In order to establish a constructive trust there must
be some fraudulent or unfair and unconscionable conduct in
the transaction by which the trustee acquires the property
rendering it inequitable for the trustee to retain absolute
title.

89 C.J.S., Trusts, §139.

In certain situations

where a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties
the courts in equity will presume fraud.
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In Hawkins v. Perry,

123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953), the court observed:
Equity imposes a constructive trust to prevent one from unjustly profiting through
fraud or the violation of a duty imposed
under a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 253 P.2d at 375.
In Renshaw v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 87 Utah 364,
49 P.2d 403 (1935), the court commented:
It is true that, upon the establishment of certain fiduciary relationship and
transactions between the parties to that
relationship, equity will presume fraud,
the abuse of confidence, and place the burden of proving good faith and fairness upon
the dominant party in the relationship.
In such cases the presumption of fraud may
be based upon the relationship alone and
relieves the party from proving the fraud,
but the fraud is nevertheless an essential
element. By the presumption equity supplies
that element. The relationships wherein
such presumption has been indulged are parent and child, principal and agent, attorney
and client, guardian and ward, executor or
administrator and heir, beneficiary or distributee. In other cases the presumption of
fraud has been given effect when there has
been a relationship of confidence plus other
circumstances tending to show that some advantage had been taken by the dominant party
with a consequent abuse of confidence. 49
P.2d at 404.
In Renshaw the court had to determine whether a relationship
of employer and employee alone would raise a presumption of
fraud in a transaction where the employee loaned the employer
some money.

The court held the mere employee-employer rela-

tionship, standing alone, would not raise the presumption
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of fraud and that facts establishing such an abuse of coni

fidence placed as would warrant fraud would have to be
!

shown. The court stated:
It is not every relationship to which the
term "fiduciary" or "confidential" might be
applied with some degree of reason or plausibility that will authorize, by itself alone,
the creation of the presumption of fraud in
the dealings between each other of those occupying that relationship. Every business
transaction involves a certain amount of confidence and trust. Equity will not discourage
transactions by creating presumptions of their
fraudulent nature, except in those cases where
the transactions occur between parties to relationships which by their very nature it is
the policy of the law to protect one of the
parties thereto on the theory that they are
not dealing on an equal basis because of the
confidence which one party to the relationship
is presumed to have in the other. See Perry
on Trusts and Trustees (6th Ed.) §194; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. (4th Ed.) §§955, 956. It
is always a question, therefore, of the actual
relationship between the parties that must be
inquired into, and not whether the terms "fiduciary," "confidential," or "trust" can, with
some degree of reason, be applied to the relationship. 49 P.2d at 404.
In Bradbury v. Rassmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d

|
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710 (1965), the plaintiffs brought an action to declare null
N

and void a warranty deed, a lease agreement, and a transfer
of water stock certificates to their niece and her husband.
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant represented the transaction to be a sale of the farm and water stock when the

*
I
' m

documents, in fact, purported to make a gift of such property,
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The court held the confidence and trust which plaintiffs
had in the defendants was not sufficient to establish such
a confidential relationship as would raise a presumption
of unfairness in the transaction or a finding of undue influence.

The court stated:

The relationship must be such as would
lead an ordinarily prudent person in
the management of his business affairs
to repose that degree of confidence in the
other party which largely results in the
substitution of the will of the latter for
that of the former in the material matters
involved in the transaction. The doctrine
of confidential relationship rests upon the
principle of inequality between the parties,
and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the parties over the other.
Mere confidence in one person by another
is not sufficient alone to constitute such
a relationship. The confidence must be reposed by one under such circumstances as to
create a corresponding duty, either legal or
moral, upon the part of the other to observe
the confidence, and it must result in a situation where as a matter of fact there is superior influence on one side and dependence on
the other. 401 P.2d at 713.
This crux of this case is an attempt to show that documents are not really what they purport to be.

The resulting

trust doctine is inapplicable because the factual context
of the case is wholly inconsistent with the circumstances
under which resulting trusts are derived.

The constructive

trust doctrine is equally inapplicable as an essential prerequisite to establishment of a constructive trust is a

-17-

showing of fraud or a fiduciary relationship which has been
betrayed.
Mr. Kohler was never employed by Mr. Hansen to represent
him in the subject transaction but was acting as a broker
for the Robinsons. Mr. Kohler occupied a fiduciary relationship to the Robinsons, Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329
P.2d 410 (1958), but not to the Hansens. A real estate
broker does not ordinarily represent both parties to a transaction.

61-2-11(4), Utah Code Annotated 1953. The trans-

action between the Kohlers and the Robinsons was an arms
length transaction; and after April 2, 1969, Mr. Hansen knew
the Kohlers were dealing in their own behalf with respect
to the Howell property.

Assuming a confidential relationship

ever existed, the relationship would have terminated on
April 2, 1969, when the warranty deed conveying the Howell
property was transferred, and did not exist at the time of
the June 12, 1969, transaction.

The facts do not raise any

presumption of fraud or unfairness in the transaction.
CONCLUSION
The Hansens conveyed the Howell property to the Kohlers
by warranty deed.

Mr. Hansen was aware of both the nature

and consequences of such a conveyance, and clearly intended
to divest himself of all incidents of ownership in the subject property.

While the parties are in disagreement as to
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the nature of the title held by the Kohlers after the discovery of the encumbrance on the Howell property the decision of the trial court should be affirmed on two grounds:
(1) the appellants have failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the warranty deed was meant as a security
instrument rather than an outright transfer of property, and
(2) to change what was formerly a clear transfer of property
to a security instrument would have to be in writing and
subscribed to by the Kohlers.

Respectfully submitted,

Bryce/E. Roe
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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